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Abstract
A non-zero-sum 3-person coalition game is pre-
sented, to study the evolution of complexity and
diversity in cooperation, where the population dy-
namics of players with strategies is given accord-
ing to their scores in the iterated game and mu-
tations. Two types of dierentiations emerge ini-
tially; biased one to classes and temporal one to
change their roles for coalition. Rules to change
the hands are self-organized in a society through
evolution. The co-evolution of diversity and com-
plexity of strategies and interactions (or communi-
cations) are found at later stages of the simulation.
Relevance of our results to the biological society is
briey discussed.
1 Introduction
In a society with inter-acting agents, emergence of
cooperation is commonly observed, while the di-
versity and complexity there are increased through
class dierentiation or temporal changes of roles.
In the present paper we discuss the mechanism of
such evolution by adopting an iterated three-person
game.
The evolution of cooperative behaviors observed
among selsh individuals has been a topic of de-
bates over decades, especially among evolutionary
biologists. There are two hypotheses, the genetical
kinship theory and the reciprocity theory, which ex-
plain the origin of such cooperation. The kinship
theory[2] gives satisfactory explanations about al-
truistic behaviour in honeybees, ant workers and so
on. On the other hand, individuals without blood
relationship one another have to recognize and
attain the cooperation in the reciprocity theory,
where Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) model is
most popularly studied. In the Pisoner's Dilemma
(PD) game, two players either cooperate or defect,
with the score in Table1. Computer tournaments
of IPD programs were organized by Axelrod, where
each player has a strategy depending on the history
of hands [1]. The most successful strategy therein
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was well-known Tit-For-Tat (TFT), that cooper-
ates on the rst move and then plays whatever the
other player chose on the previous move. When
the evolution of strategy is included, the coopera-
tion prevails in society, without any explicit indi-
cation, through the success of the TFT algorithm.
Thus the emergent society is cooperative, in which
the strategies therein are very simple and basically
uniform by players.
In the nature and in our society, the form of co-
operation is not necessarily such simple. Actions
are not always uniform in time or by players. In
the cooperation with temporal changes of actions,
which we call temporal dierentiation here, players
change their roles through some rules. Such dier-
entiation is seen in the following examples:
 In a shoal of sh such as sardines and herrings,
the risk eaten by larger sh are higher in perime-
ters. They frequently change their position and
direction, and share the risk.
 In a recent model of cell dierentiation with com-
petition for nourishment among cells [4], they ac-
tively take the foods or rest in turn, to form a
kind of time sharing system (while the biased dif-
ferentiation is observed at later stage). Such tem-
poral dierentiation is also seen in experiments
with E.Coli[5].
On the other hand, cooperation only among a
part of the members in a group is seen for example
in the following cases:
 In a group of birds, only a certain sub-group
makes alarm calls to tell other members the ex-
istence of predators.
 A small group of sh takes the risk of inspecting
potential predators. (e.g.[7])
To study such forms of cooperations with dier-
entiation of roles, a 2-person game is not adequate.
For this we introduce and study a simple non-zero-
sum 3-person game model here.
Complexity and diversity in strategy and
communication
Another drawback in the IPD model is the lack of
complexity and diversity. For the formation of co-
operation, there must be some kind of communica-
tions. In the IPD model players communicate only
Table 1: the pay-o matrix for Prisoner's Dilemma :
In each element, (S
1
; S
2
) corresponds to the score of
player 1 and player 2, respectively.
player 2
C D
player 1 Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5
Defect 5, 0 1, 1
through the information of the history of hands, ob-
tained by the repetition of games. In the evolution
of IPD model, however, the nal society is very sim-
ple with the actions Cooperate only ( in some spe-
cial cases Defect only), and the society is dominated
only by the TFT-like strategies. Thus the model
cannot explain the diversity and the complexity in
our world, where various forms of communications
and strategies coexist, ranging from simple to so-
phisticated ones.
One possible way to get rid of the drawback may
be the inclusion of noise, as player's errors of ac-
tions, as has been studied by Lindgren[6]. Through
the evolution, the memories of previous hands are
increased in the strategy, after alternations of dom-
inant strategies. In this model, however, the action
is still "Cooperate" only (except for some intervals
to get rid of the noise eect), at later generations.
The strategies are still dominated by long-term ver-
sions of the TFT. Thus the noise eect is not ade-
quate to account for the complexity and diversity.
Of course, a straightforward way to introduce the
complexity is by combinatorics, and is to include a
variety of hands in the game, like the chess. We
do not take this direction however, since we are
interested in the origin of diversity and complexity
solely through the inter-actions of players, without
implementing it in a game initially. Thus the use of
a three-person game is again requested as a possible
simplest model at the next step.
N-person game
There is a qualitative dierence between 2-person
and N-person games. (N  3) It is mainly due
to the possibility of more than two coalitions. In
an N-person game, there are variety of partitions
of players into sub-groups forming coalitions. To
form coalition, some communications are necessary
which may take complex and diverse forms, as are
made possible by temporal changes of roles in the
coalition.
In the present paper we study the simplest n-
person game, a deterministic 3-person, and non-
zero-sum game with two hands, focusing especially
on the structure of the coalition. The evolution of
articial ecology of species with dierent strategies
is studied through repeated games by players. The
main topics to be discussed are
 emergent forms of cooperations
 the evolution of algorithms and communications
 the dynamics of diversication and complexica-
tion
 the nature of the society evolved.
Indeed our simulation shows class dierentiations
between exploiting and exploited players at the ini-
tial stage, and then the temporal dierentiation of
roles to attain the cooperativity. At later stages the
co-evolution between the complexity and diversity
is found for communications and strategies.
2 Modeling
1
Left Player Right Player
10
Sub Group
Figure 1: sub-group with the right player
The rule of our three-person game is as follows;
1. Each player must hand in either card 0 or 1.
2. If two players hand in the same cards, they
are regarded as forming a sub-group, and gain
score (3 points). A player excluded from the
sub-group cannot gain any score. If all the
three players hand in the same cards, they can-
not get any score, either.
The pay-o matrix is given in Table 2. In the ta-
ble, we distinguish right and left players, assuming
that the three players are located in a circle so that
each player has its right and left player. Of course
the rule of our game keeps the right/left symme-
try. However, each player is assumed to be able to
distinguish the right and left players, which is es-
sential to the choice of its strategy, as will be seen
later.
In each round of the game, a player hands in the
cards repeatedly in succession until a given maxi-
mum round number is reached. Such iterated ac-
tions of three players as a whole will be called sim-
ply as `interaction'. The cards to be handed in by
each of the players are decided according to their
strategy, referring to the history of the states, de-
ned by the hands of the three players as in Table2.
The coding of the strategy algorithm is given by
dening an octonary tree structure according to the
Table 2: pay-omatrix of our 3-person coalition game
: The number '0' or '1' in column 2, 3, or 4 repre-
sents respectively the card that the left player, the
right player, or you have handed in. According to the
hands of the three players, there are 8 states, which
are dened through the binary representation of their
hands, as is given. If and only if your state is between
2 and 5, you are in a sub-group and can get 3 points.
state Left Right You point
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
2 0 1 0 3
3 0 1 1 3
4 1 0 0 3
5 1 0 1 3
6 1 1 0 0
7 1 1 1 0
history of the states, as in the binary tree coding
by Ikegami[3].
The memory-length, that is the number of prior
rounds to be referred for the strategy, is provided
for each algorithm, which is nite within a given
xed range. Thus, the next card to be handed in
is decided according to the nite length history of
states. Also, the information of the rst card is
given in each player's algorithm. Figure2 is an ex-
ample of the game play, where the player 1, 2 and
3 are located in an anti-clockwise order, and the
state is decided according to Table2.
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Figure 2: An example of the game play : The hor-
izontal axis shows rounds, while the the vertical axis
shows the states of the players. Dotted lines are drawn
near states 2 and 5. Players whose state is between
these dotted lines can get 3 points.
By taking an ensemble of players and regard-
ing the players with the same strategy as the same
species, we study the population dynamics of each
species. The population dynamics is dened as fol-
lows: In each step, a player makes the 3-person
game with all possible pairs of the other players,
including those from its own species. By summing
up the points of the game, a player's, accordingly
the species', score is given. The fraction of the pop-
ulation x
i
(t) for a species i is updated, following its
average score s
i
subtracted by the average points
of all the players s
1
:
x
i
(t+ 1)  x
i
(t) = d (s
i
  s)x
i
(t) (1)
where d is a growth constant. After all the fractions
x
i
(t) are updated, they are normalized to make the
population size 1.0.
When the population is updated to the next gen-
erations, a single point mutation of the algorithm
occurs with a given xed ratio (0.1 in later ex-
amples). Here the mutation adds or removes one
branch at every node in the tree of the algorithm.
As noted previously, both the game and the algo-
rithm are deterministic. Thus all the three players
of the same species hand in the same cards for each
round. Since the state and the memory-length are
nite, the change of the state must nally fall in
a periodic cycle through the iteration of the game.
The rounds showing the cyclic change of states will
be called a periodic part, while those before the
periodic part will be called a transient part.
Dierentiation of roles
In order to gain some points, the cooperation of
3 players is necessary, where one of the other two
players gives in and plays the role of an outsider
from the sub-group, or that of 2 players making
the remaining player the odd man out. In either
case, three players must split into two and one, to
gain points.
As will be observed from the result of the simu-
lation, there are two ways of dierentiations.
Class dierentiation A biased dierentiation.
The roles are xed by players, and a particular
player loses on the average and is exploited by
others. ( Figure3-(a) )
Temporal dierentiation The roles of players to
form coalitions change with time. ( Figure3-
(b) )
If one of the players is out of the coalition in turn,
each player gets 2 points on the average, and the
full and equal cooperation is attained. If the in-
teraction is not far from this ideal situation, we
call it cooperative interaction, where the aver-
age scores are high ( close to 2), and their dierence
by players is small. The interaction by the temporal
dierentiation provides a typical example.
1
If the score of a species is below the average s and its
population goes down below a given value (KillLimit), it is
assumed to be extinct, and the species is eliminated.
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Figure 3: (a) Example of class dierentiation (b) Ex-
ample of Temporary dierentiation
It may be useful to note the important dier-
ence between our game and the PD, besides the
number of players. In the PD, the two hands,
C(ooperate) or D(efect) have their specic mean-
ing, and the game is asymmetric between C and
D. Thus the evolved strategy as well as the action
should strongly depend on C or D. In our 3-person
game, the hands 0 and 1 themselves are symmet-
ric and have no specic meanings. Information to
make some kind of communication and form a sub-
group is given in the time series of the hands. As
will be seen, societies of various types of periodic
hands such as the period-3 of 001 or period-5 of
00101 are formed through the evolution.
3 Simulation results
We have carried out simulations of the 3-person
game, setting the maximum round number to 1000,
and the maximum memory length to 4. The sim-
ulation starts with 6 species whose algorithms are
given by the tree made randomly with the memory
length = 1.
First we present a rough sketch of the evolution
of our model while detailed accounts will be given
later. Through several simulations, we reach the
following scenario of the evolutionary process to the
complex and cooperative society :
1. A new species arising from mutations leads to
class dierentiation, which lowers the score of
the old species and its population. Thus the
society is tended to be dominated by the new
species.
2. This dominance is broken by the emergence
of cooperative interactions, supported by peri-
odic temporal dierentiation. The ratio of co-
operative interactions increases with the evo-
lution.
3. The temporal dierentiation of periodic
changes of hands with the 3n period (n =
1; 2   ) dominates the society. The whole
species therein shows the identical patterns of
the hands at the periodic part, while the di-
versication occurs only in the transient part.
4. Some mutants which also change the periodic
part increase their population, and dominant
periods in the society are changed. After hav-
ing experienced alternations of some dominant
periods, the society starts to allow for the coex-
istence of various periods. With this increase
of diversity, the interaction and strategy in-
crease the complexity, through the appearance
of longer periods.
All the simulations support the above evolution-
ary process, although there are subtle dierences
by simulations in the period of the cyclic change of
hands and the order of societies realized.
3.1 Class dierentiation and the
emergence of cooperation
Class dierentiation
In our 3-person game, some kind of rules, such
as the periodic exclusion from a sub-group, must be
formed by the players, to gain points by the game.
Such rule, however, is not easily formed. Except for
some special initial conditions which allow for such
cooperation by chance, some players are ignorant of
the rule of cooperation, and are exploited by oth-
ers. This leads to the class dierentiation. Since
those exploit others get higher scores, the exploita-
tion is increased through the evolution. With gen-
erations, new species with a longer memory length
appears which adopt a more complicated rule to
exploit others. Thus the class dierentiation with
a more complex strategy emerges successively.
The simplest example of class dierentiation is
shown in Figure4-(a), where two players of the same
species handing in the card 0 exclude the remain-
ing player from the sub-group. (Note again that the
player of an even state hands in card 0, while that
of the state hands in card 1. See Table2.) In this
simple case, the excluded player could have escaped
this exploitation, if it adopted a simple 2-memory-
length strategy like \if excluded twice by the same
cards, change the hand". Indeed this type of mu-
tation occurs at a later stage, while there appears
a more complicated form of the exploitation as in
Figure4-(b)(c) by using a longer memory length.
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Figure 4: Examples of Class Dierentiation : In (a), the three players are ID0, ID0, ID1|two persons from
species ID0 and one from species ID2|, get the average scores 3.000, 3.000, 0.000 respectively. (b) and (c)
are examples from later generations.
For example, in (c), the player changes cards when
excluded twice, but still it is exploited with the rate
2=3. The excluded player again can escape from the
exploitation by having a longer memory length of
the strategy (4 in this case). Thus the complexity
is increased within the class dierentiation, where
a species with a complex strategy (with a longer
memory length) dominates over a long time.
Emergence of Cooperation and its evolution
In the class dierentiation, the dominant species
increases their population by exploiting other
species. Thus, when the species occupies most pop-
ulations of the society, it cannot get scores any
more. If there appears a new species that is not
exploited by the dominant one and cooperates with
each other (Figure5-(a)), its relative population is
increased. Thus the society of class dierentiation
collapses, after which the cooperation expands in
the society. An example is given in Figure 5, where
in (c) at a later generation, the players get points
by the cooperation with periodic dierentiation of
roles.
3.2 Temporal dierentiation
stable and uniform society with temporal
dierentiation of period-3n
After the emergence of cooperative interactions
by the temporal dierentiation, the society with the
period-3n is gradually formed, where the players
equally exchange the role of the excluded. Further-
more, any set of three players from dierent species
perform the same period-3n changes of hands.
An example is given in Figure6-(a)(b), where so-
ciety with period-6 interaction emerges, and contin-
ues stably over many generations. Here, the sub-
group with the hand 1 is formed, and each of the
three players is excluded twice per 6 steps, by show-
ing the hand 0. As shown in this example, all the
three players get the equal score in the period-3n
society.
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3617
3656
3701
Figure 6: Temporal dierentiation in a uniform
period-6 society : (a) and (b) are representatives of
inter-actions in a society where all interactions are
period-6. (c) is a sample of the pseudo period-6 in-
teraction, which will destroy the period-6 society.
The diversication of the transient parts
Since each player in the period-3n society gets the
highest possible score among \equal-score" soci-
eties, it is rather dicult for a new species to ex-
ceed the predecessors by adopting a dierent type
of periodic patterns. The easiest and commonly
observed strategy of a mutant at this stage is to
preserve the periodic part and change the transient
part, during the equal cooperation is not attained.
It should be noted that the transient part is es-
sential to shift the phases of the period-3n oscilla-
tion by players, since they should change the hands
out of phase each other, to form the cooperation.
There can be a variety of choices for the transient
part. Indeed in our simulation, new species with
modied transient parts appear successively.
New species with interactions indiscernible
by old species|the end of the uniform
period-3n society
As the species of period-3n society gain points e-
ciently, a new species with modied periodic parts
have to exploit the old period-3n species, to expand
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Figure 5: The emergence of cooperation and its evolution : (a) A (right) player from species ID400 hands
in card 0, while the left player from ID400 and one from ID432 hand in card 1. Thus, both species can get
gains. This is an example of imperfect cooperation where two species gain unequal average score. In (a) to
(c), the increasing element of temporal dierentiation, by which participating species get more even score, in
each interaction can be observed,
its population. Since such mutation is not easy
( and indeed the period-6 society last over many
generations), it emerges only after a long enough
period. First, new species appears which shows
the same period-3n interactions fundamentally, but
shifting the phase to a degree undetectable by the
old species. We will call such type of interactions
as 'the pseudo period-3n interactions', in which the
periods are longer than 3n but some fractures of the
original perio-3n interaction is included. In fact, as
is shown in Figure6-(c), the new species lowers the
old species' points while retaining to a degree its
own points by performing `the pseudo period-6 in-
teractions'. The original period-6 species cannot
prevent this attack.
The transition of societies with periodic tem-
poral dierentiation
The evolution that undermines periodic parts itself
continues, even after the termination of the period-
3n society. At this stage, a variety of periodic in-
teractions appear successively.
3.3 Diversication and complication
Evolution to diversication
So far the society is composed mainly of one type
of inter-actions (with the same period). The di-
verse inter-actions are unstable and observed only
in the transition between stable societies. At this
late stage, however, the society consists of several
dierent inter-actions with dierent periods, and
remains stable.
Such society appears rst in our simulation as
the coexistence with period-3 and period-6 inter-
actions (See Figure8-(a)), which is born out of the
period-3 society. After some generations, a vari-
ety of inter-action co-exists as in Figure8-(b)(c),all
of which are examples of inter-actions chosen from
three players in the same society.
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Figure 7: The successive change of periodic societies
with generation : (a) is a sample of interactions from
period-5 society, (b) from period-18, (c) from another
type of period-5, (d) from a diversied society lasting
only for a short span, (e) from period-3.
Evolution to complexity by breaking the
phase of hands
The strategy to break the phase of the oscillation,
already seen in the pseudo-3n inter-action, is again
seen here. In contrast with the pseudo-3n case,
however, more complex inter-actions emerge suc-
cessively by breaking the phases more frequently.
For example, in Figure9-(b)(c) the periods for the
cyclic hands are about 100. The dynamics here
is rather irregular, and looks rather unpredictable.
We note that even in this society, some of the inter-
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Figure 8: The evolution to diversication from (a), (b), to (c) in time : (a1{2) co-existence of period-3 and
6 inter-actions in a society. (b1{2) that of period-3, 6, 15. (c1{5) a variety of inter-actions seen in a society.
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Figure 9: Diversication and complication : (a){(c) are representatives of inter-actions in a society. (a) is
rather simple, while others are quite complex with periods about 100.
actions remain very simple, such as the period-6
one as in Figure9(a). Complex inter-actions exist
within the diversity of species, while the diversity
is supported by the complexity in strategies.
4 Discussion
In our deterministic three-person coalition game,
we have found the evolutionary process starting
from class and temporal dierentiations of roles,
and reaching the diversication of society and the
complexication of interactions. We note such evo-
lutionary process has not been found in simulations
of 2-person games such as the IPD model.
The emergence of cooperation due to tem-
poral dierentiation of roles
When resources are in scarcity, or when some player
must bear a dangerous role, some player must suer
loss of prots. In this case, we have found two types
of dierentiations to resolve such situation, class
and temporal dierentiations.
In the class dierentiation, a caste society is
formed where only certain parties continuously suf-
fer some loss. In such society, the lower class is
nally extinct, and a new exploited class should be
formed. This process must be repeated forever to
preserve a class society, which is rather improba-
ble. Indeed, in our simulation, such society lasts
only for some time, and is typically unstable. The
society nds another solution, the dynamic change
of roles, which is cooperative and lasts as a stable
state over many generations.
In our 3-person coalition game, card 1 and 0
themselves have no specic meanings, and are sym-
metric. Some logic to break the symmetry and to
assign meanings to the dynamics of hands is self-
organized by forming rules of societies through the
evolution. Here the formation of rules is partly trig-
gered by the ability of players to distinguish the
(right/left) position. We have also made several
simulations without this ability ( in other words,
using the algorithm depending only on the numer
of 0 and 1 by the other two players, besides its own
hand), where we have found only the class dieren-
tiation, but not the temporal one. Thus the tempo-
ral dierentiation seems to be formed through the
ability of the location discrimination, for example,
by the rule that 'each player should give in if its
right player gave in in the previous round (leading
to a clockwise period-3 society).
Diversication of the society
Societies with the temporal dierentiation of var-
ious periods coexist, at a later stage in our simu-
lation. Clockwise and anti-clockwise, and cooper-
ative and exploiting interactions coexist with dif-
ferent periods such as 3, 6, and 15. This diver-
sity is possibly provided by the existence of many
\metastable" solutions without an absolute advan-
tage of any group, in our 3-person game, in which
no a priori advantage of hands (1 or 0) is imple-
mented. Indeed such diversication is not found in
the simulation of IPD model (with/without noise),
where a stable society shows cooperative actions
only, with one (or few) dominant strategy.
In reality, as in human society, there are diverse
forms of cooperations, while not all the individuals
participate in the cooperation itself. For example,
not all birds make the alarm calls discussed in sec-
tion 1. Of course, studies of an n-person game re-
quired for the alarm call of birds, but the observed
diversity in our 3-person game gives a useful sug-
gestion for future studies.
Evolution of Complexity
With the evolution, more complex interaction with
longer periods has been observed. The increase of
memory length, so far, has been observed in the
IPD model with a noise, although the action itself is
not complex there ( always `cooperate' unless noise
is added). In this respect, the emergence of longer
memory in our deterministic 3-person game may
suggest that the third player may play a kind of
role of \noise", in the course of the evolution.
However, the complexity in our game does not
only lie in the long memory length but also in the
inter-action itself ( or actions). Indeed there are two
other essential mechanisms for the complexity: One
is the competition between exploiting and avoiding
being exploited. Simple rules for the coalition are
easily detected by others, and may be exploited by
a more complex one. Thus there appears a pres-
sure for developing a complex strategy and interac-
tion. This mechanism of the evolution is common
with that observed in the imitation game [8], and
reminds us of the evolution of (secret) communi-
cation codes: Those decoded only within the same
group may be generated through complexity.
Another mechanism is related with the diversi-
cation. In a diverse society a player has to cope
with a variety of interactions. A simple strat-
egy cannot aord such diverse responses, including
for example, denial of coalition with some players,
avoiding the coalition of 3 players by temporal dif-
ferentiation, and a coalition of 2 players by class
dierentiation. Thus diversity enhances (temporal)
complexity of interactions, while the diversity itself
is supported by the complexity of strategies, since
the diversity of interactions is limited if their peri-
ods are short. Thus the diversity and complexity
of interactions and strategies co-evolve in our sim-
ulation, which seem to be seen in (real) ecological
systems and in human society.
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